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OBJECTION TO DEPENDANTS' STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
Aurora objects to defendants' statement of the case to the 
extent that it goes through a lengthy recitation of defendants' 
view of what defendants claim transpired herein prior to the 
trial court's entry of the previous final judgment on July 13, 
2004. Without getting into what Aurora considers numerous errors 
in that portion of their statement of the case, it is clear that 
what may have transpired prior to the July 13, 2004 final 
judgment is simply irrelevant and immaterial to the issues in 




DEFENDANTS' INTERPRETATION OF RULE 54(d) IS COMPLETELY 
UNSUPPORTED UNDER THE EXPRESS LANGUAGE OF THE 
RULE OR ANY CASE AUTHORITY CITED BY DEFENDANTS 
Defendants' assert that Aurora's interpretation of Rule 
54(d), Utah R. Civ. Pro., does not harmonize the two subsections 
of Rule 54(d) pertaining to costs, while their interpretation of 
those subsections does. Defendants fail to articulate any 
rational support for this bold declaration, for the simple reason 
that there is none and defendants' interpretation is contrary to 
"well-established" Utah law. 
A. The Express Language of Rule 54(d) Does Not Support 
Defendants' Interpretation. 
Rule 54(d) of our civil procedure rules is made up of two 
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subsections. Subsection (d)(1) sets out who is entitled to seek 
an award of costs, whereas subsection (d)(2) sets out the 
procedure a party must follow in order to secure a cost award. 
Defendants' entire argument to support their contention that 
Rule 54(d) expressly allows a party to seek trial court costs 
after an appeal is completed (in spite of the obvious 
contradiction with the express language of subsection (2)), is 
based on one clause contained in subsection (1), that is, "... ; 
provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review 
is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection 
with such appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the 
final determination of the cause." 
Under basic rules of interpreting our American-English 
language, this clause qualifies the portion of the sentence which 
precedes it, in this case, "Except when express provision 
therefore is made either in a statute of this state or in these 
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs;" (immediately followed 
by the clause quoted in the preceding paragraph). Thus, the 
clause upon which defendants' hang their hats does not at all 
qualify the express provisions of subsection (2) of Rule 54 as to 
how a party must procedurally seek a cost award, but simply 
means, completely consistent with Aurora's interpretation of the 
rule, that we all recognize that when an appeal or other review 
is pursued, the previously prevailing party may, after the 
appellate decision, no longer be the "prevailing party" or 
certain costs which were awarded may have been reversed in whole 
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or in part, and any final award of costs must be conformed to, or 
"abide", the final determination. The use of the term "abide" in 
itself suggests the necessity of there being an existing cost 
award prior to the appeal. 
Clearly, Aurora's interpretation harmonizes both subsections 
of Rule 54(d) and defendants' interpretation completely 
eviserates subsection (2) of Rule 54(d). When Rule 54(d)(2) 
refers to the entry of judgment, it is referring the judgments 
which are commonly designated as "final" under the provisions of 
Rule 54(a) or (b) which dispose of either all of the claims of 
all of the parties under R. 54(a) (as was the case herein), or 
are certified as final as to one or more but fewer than all of 
the claims or parties under R. 54(b), and that was the judgment 
entered on July 13, 2004, not some "new final judgment" the 
defendants conned the trial court into entering more than two 
years after their request for costs were time-barred under the 
express provisions of R. 54(d)(2). 
It should be obvious to anyone that the requirement of R. 54 
(d)(2) that the verified cost memorandum must be filed within 
five days of entry of the final judgment is, at least in part, 
structured that way to ensure that the courts are not wasting 
judicial time and resources in a second appeal over the propriety 
of a separate cost award, as defendants7 actions have 
necessitated herein. 
B. Cases Cited By Defendants Are Completely Inapposite to 
the Issues Herein. 
Defendants have cited a few cases in an attempt to support 
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their clearly untimely request for trial court costs. Not 
surprisingly, none of the cited cases lend any support whatsoever 
to defendants' position. 
First, defendants cite the Utah case of Benjamin v. Arnica 
Mut. Ins. Co., Utah 2006, 140 P.3d 1210. Although defendants 
acknowledge that the Benjamin case was merely an interlocutory 
appeal, they go on to argue that the Benjamin Court's reasoning 
should apply herein because both cases had not had a "final 
determination" entered prior to the appeal. This assertion simply 
ignores the point of the Benjamin opinion. The Benjamin Court 
clearly rejected the request for costs because it was not dealing 
with a final judgment, but with an interlocutory appeal, and 
there could be no determination as to who was the prevailing 
party, but the Court instructed the trial court to weigh the 
insured's costs on the interlocutory appeal once "it can identify 
the prevailing party." Id. at p. 1218. That is, once a final 
judgment had been entered. Clearly, the Benjamin decision merely 
stands for the proposition, in agreement with the Arizona Supreme 
Court's decision on the same issue, that costs should not be 
sought in connection with a petition for an interlocutory appeal 
until there has been a final judgment entered and the prevailing 
party is identifiable. Id. At that point, costs incurred on the 
interlocutory appeal can be evaluated along with other cost 
issues which arose prior to the entry of a final judgment. Thus, 
Benjaminy supra, is simply inapposite to the issue in this case 
where a final judgment had been entered on July 13, 2004. A brief 
comment is appropriate on defendants' suggestion at the top of 
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page 21 of their brief that, "Thus, unlike in this case, in the 
cases relied on by Aurora, there was no dispute about whether a 
"final judgment" — or, in the language of Rule 54(d)(1), a 
"final determination" — had been entered, and the issue was 
therefore not before those courts." (Emphasis added.) This 
attempt to suggest that there was, in fact, some dispute that the 
July 13, 2004 Order was a final judgment from which "an appeal 
lies," which defendants expounded upon through pages 21-22, is 
patently false. It was clear to anyone that the July 13, 2004 
Order striking Aurora's complaint as a discovery sanction was a 
final judgment, triggering the five day time limit in which 
defendants had to seek their trial costs under R. 54(d)(2). 
Defendants themselves conceded in the prior appeal that the July 
13, 2004 Order was "final" for purposes of appeal by conceding 
the appellate court's jurisdiction thereon. Defendant's attempt 
to suggest in their brief at p. 22 that the Order, which their 
counsel drafted, had what were seemingly unnecessary, superfluous 
provisions in it that defendants claim "suggested" that post-
appeal proceedings were anticipated, is simply irrelevant. 
Whether post-appeal procedings were anticipated did not relieve 
defendants of seeking their trial costs within five days of the 
entry of the July 13, 2004 Order, which was clearly a "final 
judgment." Defendants are merely attempting to confuse the issue 
by using interchangably the terms "final judgment" and "final 
determination of the cause." In actuality, "final judgment" is 
the commonly used term for those judgments, orders or decrees 
from which an appeal lies under R. 54(a) & (b), whereas the 
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phrase "final determination of the cause" is simply used in 
R.54(d)(1) to indicate that stage of litigation proceedings after 
an appeal has been decided which may alter the trial court's 
initial determination as to who the prevailing party is. The 
terms, as used in R. 54(d), are clearly not the same, and do not 
refer to the same stage of the proceedings. 
Second, defendants cite a couple cases from Florida, one 
from Maryland and one from Alabama to support their claim that 
Utah's Rule 54(d) allows a party to wait until after an appeal to 
apply for trial court costs. Those cases are again simply 
inapposite to this case, and offer no support to defendants7 
position. 
Of course, when citing decisions from foreign jurisdictions 
to support a particular interpretation of Utah procedural law, it 
is incumbent on the propounding party to demonstrate why these 
foreign decisions should be persuasive to the Utah court, which 
is generally done by showing the similarity of, if not outright 
identical, language of the two state's statutory or procedural 
provisions. Of course, defendants provide no comparison of the 
respective rules pertaining to awards of trial costs. A more 
careful look into the cases cited by defendants and those states' 
procedural rules reveals why: those states'procedural rules 
either are not or were not at the time of the cited decisions 
similar to Utah's. 
In the case from Alabama, Hinson v. Holt, 776 So.2d 804 
(Ala.Civ.App.1998), Alabama's Rule 54(d) is like that of the 
federal rules, that is, without any express time limit as to when 
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a motion for costs must be pursued, and the Hinson Court, citing 
prior Alabama case authority, concluded that since the assessment 
of costs under Alabama law may be done at any time prior to 
issuance of execution, the pendency of an appeal was immaterial 
to the question of the timeliness of the motion for assessment of 
costs. Thus, the Hinson decision is completely inapposite to the 
issue herein because of Utah's express time limitation for filing 
for trial costs. 
In the Maryland case, Litty v. Becker, 656 A.2d 365 (Md.App. 
1995), the court was dealing with interpreting a statute which 
imposes costs as a sanction under standards similar to federal 
Rule 11. However, the decision was based upon the fact that the 
Maryland rule at issue "contains no time limit for filing a 
motion for costs." Id. at p. 369. Thus, the Maryland court 
concluded that the only time limitation on such a cost request 
was the equitable consideration of whether considering such a 
motion "would unduly prejudice the non-moving party." Id. at p. 
368. 
As to the Florida cases, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. 
Horkheimer, 901 So.2d 329 (Fla.App. 4 Dist 2005) and Chamizo v. 
Forman, 933 So.2d 1241 (Fla.App. 3 Dist 2006), they are both 
inapposite to the instant action. In the Horkheimer case, the 
trial court's initial decision had been reversed because the 
plaintiff had obtained a default against State Farm and then 
obtained a judgment far in excess of of the relief requested 
along with attorney fees entered without notice to State Farm. On 
the initial appeal, the judgments were set aside and the case 
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remanded to the trial court. The plaintiff then moved for entry 
of judgment and an award of attorney fees and costs, which were 
ultimately entered. The Horkheimer Court ruled that since the 
prior judgment had been entirely set aside, the time limit on the 
motion for costs and fees did not run until a new judgment was 
entered, and the motion was therefore timely (though the fee 
award was set aside again because it still lacked any foundation 
of time spent and rates charged. Id. at p. 331-32. 
The Chamizo case involved a question of whether a judgment 
which includes an award of attorney fees but reserves the issue 
of the amount for later hearing acted as an automatic extension 
of the recently enacted Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.525, 
which required a motion for fees and costs to be filed within 
thirty days of the filing of the judgment. The Chamizo Court held 
that it did, relying on Florida case law predating the adoption 
of R. 1.525. However, the Chamizo decision appears to have been 
dead on arrival, since the Florida Supreme Court had just issued 
a decision in Saia Motor Freight Line, Inc. v. Reid, 930 So.2d 
598 (Fla. 2006) which rejected the reasoning of the Third 
District and others in favor of the bright-line reasoning of 
other Florida appellate districts. Id. Thus, Chamizo appears to 
have no value in Florida and certainly should have no persuasive 
effect in light of Utah's "well-settled" law on the timing of a 
motion for costs. 
C. Defendants' Assertion That This Is a Case of First 
Impression In Utah Is Simply Ridiculous, 
Defendants finally assert that because none of the abundant 
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case authority cited by Aurora specifically involve a situation 
where the prevailing party waited until after an appeal to 
request an award of its trial court costs, this is a case of 
first impression in Utah. To call this argument of defendants 
specious would be giving it far too much credit. Contrary to the 
implications of defendants' argument, all of the cases cited by 
Aurora as authority for the untimeliness of defendants7 
application for costs were faced with the same issue involved 
herein: was the prevailing party's application for a trial cost 
award timely under the requirements of Rule 54(d), Utah R. Civ. 
Pro.? There is nothing about the fact that the defendants herein 
were REALLY untimely in their application for a trial cost award, 
as opposed to just a little untimely, that should persuade our 
appellate courts to think that the reasoning of all these cases 
cited by Aurora would change because of this immaterial factual 
distinction. Could it be that all the judges signing off on these 
opinions could have been wrong? Of course not! Had any of these 
appellate judges believed that defendants' interpretation of Rule 
54(d) was correct or even plausible, they presumably would have 
ruled completely contrary to how they actually did rule. Instead 
of uniformly ruling that trial cost requests filed more than five 
days after the entry of the final judgment under R. 54(a) or (b) 
and ordering them stricken, the Utah appellate courts would have 
ruled that since an appeal was filed, there was no issue of 
timeliness raised. Of course, they did not do so. Further, does 
anyone really expect that after any of these Utah decisions cited 
by Aurora, the trial court on remand would have entertained a 
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motion to enter a "new final judgment" in order to allow a cost 
award contrary to the express holding of the appellate court? Of 
course not! Defendants' assertion that this is a case of first 
impression in Utah is patently absurd, and a further indication 
that defendants' position was and continues to be frivolous. 
POINT II 
DEPENDANTS' ARGUMENTS ON THE SANCTIONS ISSUE 
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY LEGITIMATE FACTS 
OR BY UTAH LAW 
Defendants arguments as to the issue of whether sanctions 
under Rule 11, Utah R. Civ. Pro., or various rules of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure would be appropriate under the 
circumstances herein do not provide any real factual or legal 
support for their position. 
Subpoint A of Point II of defendants' brief boils down to a 
simple declaration that after a "reasonable" investigation they 
"reasonably" believed their claim for costs was proper, and that 
since the trial court approved their cost award, it could not 
have been a violation of Rule 11. Fortunately for Aurora, 
defendants' argument on this matter is not supported by Utah law. 
As to the assertion that the trial court's approval of 
defendants' trial cost award should alone foreclose any 
determination on appeal that Rule 11 was violated, it is contrary 
to Utah law. It is established Utah law that whether specific 
conduct amounts to a violation of Rule 11 is a question of law, 
and no deference is accorded the trial court's ruling thereon. 
Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Taylor v. 
Estate of Taylorf 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Thus, the 
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mere fact that the trial court, for reasons known only to it, 
approved defendants trial court costs contrary to "well-
established" Utah law does not provide any defense to defendants 
on the question of whether Rule 11 was violated. 
As to defendants' purported "reasonable" belief after their 
purported "reasonable" investigation, that issue is to be 
determined by an objective standard, not a subjective one. Giffen 
v. R.W.L., 913 P.2d 761 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Although defendants 
do not provide any meaningful explanation of what investigation 
they conducted to arrive at their belief that their claim for 
trial court costs was warranted by existing law, the implication 
of their statements is that they only looked at the language of 
Rule 54(d) and concluded that they were justified in believing it 
was perfectly proper to wait until after the appeal to file for 
trial court costs, in spite of such action being contrary to the 
express language of R. 54(d)(2). Apparently defense counsel felt 
it was not worth their time to actually look at some cases which 
interpreted the "well-established" law of the time limit set out 
in R. 54(d)(2), and felt confident in their completely 
unsupported interpretation of R. 54(d). This is essentially the 
"empty head - pure heart" defense which has been rejected by 
courts. Thornton v. Wall. 787 F.2d 1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 
1986)("Rule 11 requires counsel to study the law before 
representing its contents to a federal court. An empty head but a 
pure heart is no defense."); Chambers v. American Trans Air, 
Inc. , 17 F.3d 998 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. den. 115 S.Ct. 512, 513 
U.S. 1001, 130 L.Ed.2d 419(same). Contrary to defendants7 
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apparent position, Aurora believes it is not objectively 
reasonable to not look at any case law interpreting this 
procedural rule because you claim to be satisfied that your 
interpretation of the rule is correct, particularly when that 
interpretation is contrary to the express language of the rule. 
Further, contrary to defendants7 implication, a showing of bad 
faith is not required to find a violation of Rule 11, but 
certainly may be relevant to the severity of sanction imposed. 
Next, defendants7 argument in subpart B of Point II of their 
brief misconstrues the issue of discretion of a trial court under 
Rule 11 analysis. Obviously, since the trial court simply signed 
the "new final judgment" and awarded defendants their trial 
costs, the trial court never even got to the point of exercising 
its discretion, and therefore defendants7 entire discussion about 
abuse of discretion is not pertinent to any issue herein. 
Finally, defendants7 argument that the appellate court 
should not impose sanctions herein construes Rules 33 and 40, 
Utah R. App. Pro., too narrowly when they suggest that sanctions 
are not warranted herein. As to Rule 33, defendants suggest that 
since they are not filing a motion or taking the appeal, 
sanctions against them under R. 3 3 are not permitted. Although R. 
33(a) does mention only motions or an appeal, subsection (b) 
makes clear that the rule also applies to a "brief or other 
paper." Defendants7 brief therefore brings them within the 
parameters of R. 33. As to Rule 40, Subsection (a) clearly 
includes briefs and other papers within the scope of this rule, 
which is essentially the appellate equivalent of Rule 11, Utah R. 
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Civ. Pro. It will be up to the appellate court to determine 
whether defendants' brief meets the standards set out in Rule 
40(a). Aurora believes that in light of the overwhelming, "well-
established" decisional authority contrary to defendants' 
interpretation of R. 54 (d) , Utah R. Civ. Pro., defendants have 
proffered no rational basis to justify their arguments in support 
of their interpretation, and those arguments fail to meet the 
standards set and are frivolous. Thus, defendants are subject to 
sanctions under either Rules 33 or 40 if the appellate court 
agrees that defendants7 arguments have no merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court7s action of entering a "new final judgment" 
for the sole purpose of allowing defendants their trial court 
costs was clearly erroneous under the express language of R. 
54(d), Utah R. Civ. Pro., and the numerous cases interpreting it. 
The trial court further erred in not sanctioning defendants 
under Rule 11 for their frivolous argument for the cost award. 
The Court should direct the trial court to award Aurora sanctions 
against defendants for asserting such frivolous arguments, 
awarding Aurora its costs and reasonable attorney fees in amounts 
to be determined upon remand. 
Further, the Court should award Aurora multiple costs along 
with such other sanctions as the Court deems proper under Rules 
33 and 40, Utah R. App. Pro., since defendants have continued 
asserting their frivolous arguments in this appeal. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of April, 2007. 
Eric P. 'Hartman 
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